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Economie Debts and Political Gains: 
Electoral Support for the NAZI Party in Agrarian 
and Commercial Sectors, 1928-1933 
Jürgen W. Falter* 
Abstract: It is by now a well-established fact that the 
NSDAP fared best in the protestant rural parts of Ger-
many and among the (again protestant) self-employed. 
Both groups were affected during the depression by de-
creasing prizes, reduced business transactions and lower 
income. The following analysis is trying to figure out by 
means of correlation, regression and path analysis what 
part was played by the economic crisis and especially 
agrarian and non-agrarian debts in the genesis of this 
very strong affinity of the protestant farming and non-
farming old middle class to National Socialism. The re-
sults of various bivariate and multivariate analyses qui-
te strongly indicate that there was an independent effect 
of the incidence of agrarian and non-agrarian debts on 
the electoral success of the Hitler movement. We may 
thus conclude that there is indeed a very high probabi-
lity that the relative numerical significance of economic 
debts furthered the rise of National Socialism at the bal-
lot box. 
1. There is a striking parallel between the rise of unemployment and the 
electoral surge of the NSDAP in Weimar Germany after 1928. This almost 
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identical development of the two curves has convinced many a historian 
that it were - among others - mainly the unemployed who had voted in 
disproportionate numbers for the NSDAP. This persuasion dominated hi-
storical interpretations of the period for decades. In the meantime, howe-
ver, we have been able to demonstrate by means of new data and somew-
hat more refined statistical tools that in contradistinction to the once pre-
vailing view the NSDAP vote varied inversely with the percentage of un-
employed at the level of counties and communities: The higher the pro-
portion of unemployed in the electorate (or the population or the available 
work force), the lower, on average, the NSDAP share of the vote; and vice 
versa, the higher the NSDAP vote, the lower the mean percentage of un-
employed. (1) 
2. The at first sight contradictory relationship between unemployment and 
the Nazi vote at the Reich and the county level clearly results from a 
positive longitudinal and a negative cross-sectional correlation. (2) This 
finding so far withstood all kinds of refuting efforts; it therefore has to be 
accepted - at least for the time being - as a relatively corroborated result of 
electoral history. Furthermore, there is some evidence (established by 
multivariate ecological regression analysis) that not only the counties or 
communities with a higher than average level of unemployment but also 
the unemployed themselves voted less than average for Hitler and his 
movement. (3) 
3. The longitudinal relationship between the development of the crisis of 
the years 1929 to 1933 and the surge of the NSDAP vote suggests that the 
economic catastrophe radicalized the electorate by shattering the confiden-
ce of a majority of the German population into first the established Wei-
mar parties and ultimately the whole political system. More and more 
people lost faith into the political competence of the ruling elites to deal 
with the immediate effects of the crisis (such as extremely high levels of 
unemployment, bankruptcy, the foreclosure sale of farms and other finan-
cial fiascoes). The cross-sectional relationship, on the other hand, conveys 
that this radicalizaron was channeled by the prevalent political regionally 
defined and class-based traditions: the city dwellers and the unemployed 
(some 80 percent of them were blue-collar workers) mainly got radicalized 
towards the left, i.e. the communist KPD, the rural population and the 
self-employed turned towards the right, i.e. the National Socialist Hitler 
Movement. (4) 
4. These are, of course, a posteriori interpretations which fit our data but 
are by no means fully covered by them. The electoral history of the Wei-
mar period has to rely on aggregate data; there are no opinion surveys 
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available for this period which meet any advanced methodological stan-
dards. Our data sets thus contain hundreds of electoral, demographical, 
economical, and social-structural variables on a county or community ba-
sis. Unfortunately they do not include any direct information on the mo-
tivations or attitudes of the voters. For this reason the potential of histo-
rical election studies is somewhat restricted if we compare it to modern 
electoral analysis. What we can do, however, is to reconstruct the objective 
situation of the act of voting, i.e. we may discern possible influences acting 
upon the voters and find out if they are related to their political beha-
vior. (5) This has been done in regard to the working class and unemploy-
ment. In regard to the old middle class some hypotheses about the impact 
of the economic crisis upon voting behavior have been published; (6) but 
up to now they have seldom been adequately researched. (7) In the follo-
wing I will try to find out if there is a statistical relationship between some 
indicators of crisis-related effects upon the old middle class and the Nazi 
vote. 
5. It is by now a well established fact that the NSDAP fared best in the 
protestant rural parts of Germany and among the (again protestant) self-
employed. With no exception the strongest Nazi constituencies were loca-
ted in some of the most agrarian and protestant parts of Germany. In 
Rothenburg o.T. (Land) the NSDAP got 83 percent of the valid vote as 
early as in July 1932, 81 percent in Uffenheim, 79 percent in Neu-
stadt/ Aisch, 76 percent in Ansbach (Land) etc. In the predominantly pro-
testant rural counties the Nazi vote thus amounted to an average of 41 
percent of the eligible voters in July 1932 (compared to an average of 31 
percent in the whole Reich and a mere 18 percent in the predominantly 
catholic rural areas). (8) If our ecological regression estimates are correct, 
about 42 percent of all self-employed and an impressive 55 percent of the 
non-catholic old middle class (both including »helping family members«) 
voted NSDAP at the July 1932 election. (9) What part was played by the 
economic crisis in the genesis of this very strong affinity of the farming 
and non-farming old middle class to National Socialism? 
6. Naturally, both the farming population and the self-employed in trade 
and commerce were not directly threatened by unemployment. They were, 
however, indirectly affected by decreasing prizes, reduced business trans-
actions and lower income. Thus, the economic crisis not only boosted un-
employment but also led to dangerously growing debts, an ever increasing 
number of bankruptcies and the enforced foreclosure sale of farms and 
small enterprises. Between 1925 and 1933 the yearly income of the self-
employed fell from 3,540 to 2,500 RM while that of the gainfully employed 
dropped »only« from 1,710 to 1,520 RM. No wonder that in 1932 exactly 
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18,393 farms went into insolvency (more than ever before), that almost 
50,000 business firms went bankrupt between 1930 and 1932, that more 
and more farmers and small businesspersons earned less than they had to 
spend for mortgages, loans and supplies. (10) The farmers in particular, 
especially those in the eastern and north-eastern parts of Germany, were 
hit twice in less than a decade: first by the agrarian crisis after 1925 and 
again by the Great Depression of 1929 and the years following. As a con-
sequence they first left their traditional parties, especially the conservative, 
right-wing German Nationalists, in order to join agrarian interest parties 
which in turn for many rural voters served as a kind of catalyst on their 
way to the Nazis. Outside of the agrarian sector the old middle class left 
the liberal and conservative parties after the inflation period and flocked 
into a variety of newly founded interest parties. But did economic strains 
really play any significant role in that turnover of formerly conservative or 
national-liberal voters to the NSDAP? 
7. Unfortunately on the level of all counties or larger communities of the 
Reich there is no published data on the foreclosure sale of farms or on 
bankruptcies. There is some official information available, however, on 
debts in both the agrarian and the commercial sector of the economy. (11) 
Therefore, I will concentrate in the following on questions relating to the 
impact of debts on the NSDAP vote; for example it will be interesting to 
find out if the propensity to vote NSDAP was furthered by agrarian and 
non-agrarian debts, as Kaltefleiter or Heberle proposed some twenty years 
ago. (12) I will do this in three consecutive steps, beginning with a kind of 
tree analysis, then turn to multivariate regression analysis and finally end 
with a variety of latent variables path analysis. 
8. Before we turn to the findings of our statistical analysis a few words 
about the theoretical meaning and the operationalization of the debt in-
dicators used should be said. In the official census statistics agrarian and 
non-agrarian debts are reported for the (about 1000) counties or (about 
350) minor financial districts in Reichsmark. Additional information is 
supplied on the number of indebted farms, their acreage and total value in 
Reichsmark (on the basis of minor financial districts); other official figu-
res deal with the number and the net value of the indebted non-agrarian 
enterprises and the number of all enterprises (on the basis of counties). 
Normally in the official statistical accounts of the Weimar period the re-
lative indebtedness of a county is calculated either as a percentage of debts 
on the basis of total values of the indebted farms and enterprises or, for 
farms only, as debts per hectare (one hectare equals roughly 2.5 acres). The 
same types of debt measures are used by Heberle, Kaltefleiter and the 
American scholar Waldman in their inquiries of the NSDAP constituency. 
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All three of them do indeed find a positive (bivariate) relationship bet-
ween agricultural debt and the Nazi vote. But, as pointed out elsewhere, 
Heberle's study is restricted to one agricultural area, Schleswig-Holstein in 
the North of Germany, Katltefleiter's interpretations are based on a com-
parison of only a handful of extreme, arbitrarily selected cases, and Wald-
man's analysis is restricted in regard to his debt indicator to the 26 state 
financial districts (Landesfinanzamtsbezirke). In addition, nobody to my 
knowledge has yet tried to extend the investigation to all counties or re-
gions of the Weimar Republic, or to include non-agrarian debts. 
9. In the first step of the following empirical analysis I will work with the 
same kind of debt indicator as Heberle, Kaltefleiter and Waldman do. I am 
aiming here at a replication of their findings for the entire Reich. In Table 
1 some zero-order correlation coefficients are reported for all counties of 
the Reich; (13) in Table 2 these counties are split up into three subgroups 
(terciles) according to the percentage of farming population living in each 
county. (14) Between 1930 and 1933 the relative intensity of agrarian debts 
and the percentage of NSDAP votes indeed seem to vary simultaneously 
both on the level of all counties and within the three county-subgroups. 
Where farm debts are comparatively high the NSDAP vote tends to be 
slightly above average, and where agrarian debts are low the NSDAP vote 
is expected to fall somewhat below average. The same is true when we 
correlate farm debts and the increase or decrease of the NSDAP vote. The 
relationship is especially strong in the agrarian parts of Germany: The 
higher the agrarian debts the stronger in general the increase of the 
NSDAP vote between 1928 and 1930, and the more pronounced the de-
crease of the Nazi party in November, 1932. In regard to non-agrarian 
debts there too is some covariation between the percentage of indebted 
firms and the share of the NSDAP vote, but there is no such clear-cut 
relationship as with the agrarian debts. 
10. These preliminary results seem to corroborate some of the earlier fin-
dings. But are these commonly used debt indicators really a good measure 
of indebtedness for cliometric purposes? According to my view the ope-
rationalizations used in Tables 1 and 2 may lead to somewhat artificial 
results and spurious correlations because there is no control for the rela-
tive importance of farming or commerce within each county. Thus, in a 
given county there may be only a handful of farms; if a majority of them 
were exceedingly indebted, this would result in a very high value of the 
debt indicators, but only very few voters would actually be affected by 
debts at all. In another case, in a predominantly agrarian county again, a 
majority of farms could be moderately indebted (which would result in a 
much lower value of the debt indicator); but this time a substantial 
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amount of voters could positively be afflicted by debts. The same is true, in 
essence, in regard to the indicator measuring debts per acre or hectare and 
in regard to the two measures of non-agrarian debts in Tables 1 and 2. Both 
indicators, debts per hectare and debts as a percentage of total value or 
gross income, therefore do not adequately describe the »true«, i.e. in terms 
of voting behavior relevant indebtedness of a territorial unit. 
Since we want to explain or predict past voting behavior with the help of 
agrarian and non-agrarian debts we should instead construct our debt in-
dicators in such a way that they genuinely reflect the potential impact of 
debts on the electorate. For this reason we will deal in the following main-
ly with an indicator which tries to measure the relative numerical signi-
ficance of agrarian and non-agrarian debts for the electorate; in the suc-
ceeding sections the percentage of indebted farms (or enterprises), calcu-
lated on the basis of the eligible voters of a county, will serve as our main 
indicator of the relative numerical significance of debts for the electora-
te. (15) 
11. On a bivariate level the percentage of NSDAP votes is positively cor-
related with the relative numerical significance of agrarian and non-agra-
rian debts in some elections and social contexts, in others it is not (s. 
GRAPHS 1A and 1B). In contrast to the positive correlation between non-
agrarian debts and the NSDAP vote there is no interpretable statistical 
association between farm debts and the NSDAP vote in 1928 and 1930 on 
the level of all counties; after 1930, however, the NSDAP vote tends to be 
above average where agrarian debts are more widespread. That this may 
represent a spurious correlation becomes clear when dividing up our 831 
territorial units into 593 counties with a predominantly rural and 238 
counties with a predominantly urban population. In the more rural regions 
the positive correlation between agrarian debts and the NSDAP vote wit-
hers away; only in 1933 a small positive relationship prevails. The cor-
relation between the non-agrarian debts and the NSDAP vote, on the other 
hand, even increases in size. The spuriousness may result from the fact 
that debts and NSDAP votes tend to be more numerous in the protestant 
parts of Germany. In a second step we therefore split up the rural and 
urban counties according to their religious composition. We now are able 
to demonstrate that in catholic rural counties there is - with the exception 
of March, 1933 - not a positive but even a negative statistical relationship 
between agrarian debts and the electoral success of the Nazi party. The 
non-catholic rural parts of Germany, on the other hand, show a quite 
strong correlation between the two variables. In the more urbanized coun-
ties (where we look at the relationship between non-agrarian debts and the 
NSDAP vote) religious denomination does not make such a difference. In 
the last step of our tree comparison we again divide the different county 
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categories according to an above or below average farm size (in the rural 
counties) or city size (in the urban counties). In the predominantly catholic 
and rural areas farm size does not make much of a difference, in the 
protestant counties with larger farms, however, the NSDAP vote was so-
mewhat higher where agrarian debts were above average. Irrespective of 
religious denomination in the urban parts of Germany the (mainly posi-
tive) correlation between (non-agrarian) debts and the NSDAP vote is sig-
nificantly stronger in the smaller municipalities than in the larger towns 
and cities. 
12. If we direct our attention to the percentage change of the NSDAP vote 
between pairs of consecutive elections (GRAPH 2) we get some additional 
information on the relationship between debts and the electoral success of 
the Nazi party. Thus we find that the electoral gains of the NSDAP in July, 
1932 and March, 1933 are somewhat higher, on the average, where the 
percentage of indebted farms was above the Reich level, and a little bit 
lower, where the indebtedness was below the Reich mean. The same is true 
for the relationship between non-agrarian debts and the NSDAP vote gains 
in 1930 and July, 1932. Undeniably, the differences between counties with 
an above and below average incidence of debts are far from overwhelming, 
but they are consistent from the first to the last splitting level of our tree; 
in magnitude they are comparable to the effects of many other explanatory 
variables of the NSDAP vote such as the percentage of blue-collar voters, 
unemployed, civil servants etc. The discriminative effect of Catholicism, of 
course, is much stronger in regard to the surge of National Socialism, 
especially in its interaction with the urban-rural variable. Nevertheless the 
results of this tree comparison quite strongly indicate that there may be 
indeed an independent effect of the incidence of agrarian and non-agra-
rian debts on the electoral success of the Hitler movement. 
13. Since the results of the above tree comparisons depend to a certain 
degree on the choice of cutting points it is advisable to countercheck them 
by means of multiple regression analysis, using the same variables as in 
GRAPHS 1 and 2. Normally regression analysis yields more or less the 
same results as tree comparisons do. This is also the case in regard to the 
regression coefficients in Table 3: The relative numerical significance of 
debts indeed seems to have inflated the average NSDAP vote. In the more 
urbanized counties the incidence of non-agrarian debts in 1930 and 1933 
even displayed about the same relative influence as religious denomina-
tion. 
14. Although two of the most important predictors of the NSDAP vote, 
namely confession and urbanization, have been included in the above 
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regression models the statistical influence of the various debt variables 
may still result from their strong correlation with the percentage of self-
employed or farming population (with correlation coefficients ranging bet-
ween r= 0.63 and r= 0.85, depending on operationalization and social con-
text). It therefore seems advisable to control for the potential influence of 
the self-employed variable and see if there is still a residual effect of debts 
on the NSDAP vote. In doing this we must, of course, be aware of multi-
collinearity problems which may arise from the strong correlation of both 
kinds of variables. 
That multicollinearity does not play a significant role can be seen by a 
comparison of the regression coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 which are 
identical in their first three predictors (with %INDEP introduced in a step-
wise regression model as the last predictor of Table 4). Adding the per-
centage of self-employed does neither significantly change the explanatory 
power of the regression model nor the influence of the debt variable on the 
NSDAP vote. Only in regard to the March, 1933 elections and only in 
respect to the NSDAP vote-change the self-employed variable seems to 
take over some of the predictive power of the debt variable. In all other 
instances debts continue to exert a positive effect both on the share and on 
the change of the Nazi vote. 
15. In order to control for other potentially disturbing factors we have 
computed virtually dozens of regression models, using a variety of alter-
native predictors and operationalizations of the debt concept. Limits of 
space and time do not allow to present any of these equations. There was, 
however, not a single case where (agrarian and non-agrarian) debts did not 
relate in a positive manner with either the NSDAP share of the vote or its 
change from election to election. To go one step further we developed a 
number of path models with latent variables as predictors. They represent 
a blend of factor and regression analysis based on partial least squares 
estimation and allow to include many more variables into one explanatory 
model than simple regression analysis would do. We developed these path 
models for three different types of dependent variables: (a) the share of the 
NSDAP vote (measured as a percentage of the total electorate), (b) the 
percentage change of the NSDAP vote (measured as the difference bet-
ween the second and first election of each pair of elections) and (c) the 
share of the NSDAP vote (measured as in [a] but treated as a lagged end-
ogenous variable). We thus obtained three different latent path models 
with religion, urbanization, self-employed, wealth and agrarian and non-
agrarian debts as predictors of the NSDAP vote. In all three models debts 
exert an independent effect on the NSDAP vote comparable to that of the 
regression analyses of Tables 3 and 4. Since the results of models (a) and 
(b) largely correspond to the results of our multiple regression analyses of 
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Tables 3 and 4 I will restrict the graphical representation of the results to 
the third model, i.e. the model using lagged endogenous variables. In this 
model the percentage of NSDAP votes is both explained by its predecessor 
and the other variables. Following the logic of this model our two debt 
indicators serve as predictors of the NSDAP increase from election to 
election (the November, 1932 election was left out of the models for rea-
sons of parsimony). Again there is some positive effect exerted by agrarian 
and non-agrarian debts. This effect is particularly pronounced in the July, 
1932 and March, 1933 elections to the Reichstag. These results are largely 
consistent with our regression findings. We may thus conclude that there is 
indeed a very high probability that the relative numerical significance of 
economic debts furthered the rise of National Socialism at the ballot box. 
16. From a methodological point of view the hypothesis that part of the 
electoral successes of the Nazis could be explained by indebtedness with-
stood a whole series of falsification efforts. Our analysis thus not only 
supports the notion of the Hitler movement as a catch-all party of pro-
test (16) but may stand as a good historical example of the influence of 
economic hardships on electoral behavior and the possible fate of demo-
cracies in times of severe crises. By turning away from the (more or less 
democratic) Weimar parties large segments of the German old middle class 
(and many voters of the other strata of society as well) seem to have exer-
ted a kind of punishing behavior, blaming first the established political 
forces and eventually the whole political system for apparently not being 
able to cope with the urgent demands of the social and economic crisis of 
their country. For quite obvious reasons I hesitate to interpret this type of 
punishing behavior as being »rational« in terms of rational choice theory. 
But from a strictly formal perspective it may well fall under this label. (17) 
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terms of the eligible voters). This indicator gives high values if both 
the intensity and the relative numerical significance of debts are 
high; it yields low values where both are low; and it ranges somew-
here in between where either one of them is low and the other high 
or both are medium. This indicator is operationalized as following: 
agrarian debts per total farm value * indebted farms per voter (an 
alternative could be: agrarian debts per acre * indebted farms per 
voter; or non-agrarian debts per total enterprise value * indebted 
enterprises per voter). This indicator also yields a positive relations-
hip between indebtedness and the NSDAP share of the vote. 
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(16) Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter. The Social Foundations of Fas-
cism in Germany, 1919-1933. Chapel Hill (University of North Ca-
rolina Press) 1983, p.268. 
(17) This line of argument is delineated in regard to the (presumed) elec-
toral preferences of the unemployed by the two Swiss economists 
Bruno S. Frey and Hannelore Weck, Hat Arbeitslosigkeit den Auf-
stieg des Nationalsozialismus bewirkt? In: Jahrbuch für Nationalö-
konomie und Statistik, 196, 1981, pp. 1-31, especially pp. 9/10. 
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TABLE 1: T H E CORRELATION BETWEEN A G R A R I A N AND NON-
A G R A R I A N DEBTS AND THE NAZI VOTE 1928-1933 
All counties 1928 30 32J 32N 33 28/30 30/32 32/32 32/33 
Agrarian debts 
1. Debt/total value -12 27 29 26 32 36 22 -24 14 
2. Debt/hectare -08 24 21 18 11 31 13 -25 -16 
Non-agrarian debts 
1. Debt/net value 01 05 -11 --12 --16 05 -21 02 -09 
2. % indebted firms 05 22 11 07 03 23 -02 -21 -09 
County level data, N = 831; weighting factor: average number of eligible 
voters per county for the electoral period 1928-1933; cell entries: Pearson's 
r * 100. 
TABLE 2: T H E CORRELATION BETWEEN A G R A R I A N AND NON-
A G R A R I A N DEBTS AND THE NAZI VOTE 1928-1933 IN PR ED O-
MINANTLY AGRARIAN, PREDOMINANTLY NON-AGRARIAN 
AND M I X E D COUNTIES 
Agrarian counties 
Agrarian debts 
1. Debt/total value -29 38 31 28 34 48 19 -33 11 
2. Debt/hectare -20 33 24 21 23 41 11 -25 02 
3. % indebted farms 00 05 03 05 10 05 01 05 12 
Non-agrarian debts 
1. Debt/net value -15 26 25 21 24 32 19 -29 02 
2, % indebted firms -22 23 20 16 19 31 13 -27 04 
Mixed counties 
Agrarian debts 
1. Debt/total value -03 31 30 26 30 36 21 -30 05 
2. Debt/hectare 05 27 27 23 20 28 19 -28 -14 
Non-agrarian debts 
1. Debt/net value -01 02 -09 -08 -08 02 -15 06 00 
2. % indebted firms -01 12 11 07 13 14 08 -21 12 
Urban counties 
Agrarian debts 
1. Debt/total value -08 21 28 27 28 29 24 -15 -00 
2. Debt/hectare -16 21 30 26 25 35 27 -28 -06 
Non-agrarian debts 
1. Debt/net value 03 02 -17 -17 -16 10 -28 06 07 
2. % indebted firms 15 31 24 20 26 30 09 -27 17 
Cell entries: Pearson's r * 100. Same data base and weighting factor as 
Table 1. 
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TABLE 3: THE VARIABLES OF GRAPH 1 AND GRAPH 2 IN THE 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL 
(Standardized regression coefficients * 100) 
1. All counties 
%NSDAP DEBTS %CATH %URBAN Expl. %CHANGE DEBTS %CATH %URBAN Expl. 
1928 21 -08 20 2% 
1930 15 -52 06 27% 1928/30 08 -56 -02 31% 
1932J 27 -74 -13 62% 1930/32 29 -69 -24 64% 
1932N 26 -70 -15 56% 1932/32 -15 51 -01 26% 
1933 38 -60 -21 58% 1932/33 30 24 -15 27% 
2. Predominantly rural counties 
%NSDAP ADEBTS %CATH FSIZE Expl. %CHANGE ADEBTS %CATH %FSIZE Expl. 
1928 12 -22 -08 5% 
1930 04 -62 08 40% 1928/30 01 -61 12 40% 
1932J 22 -86 -00 70% 1930/32 30 -83 -06 65% 
1932N 23 -81 -02 61% 1932/32 -02 60 -10 39% 
1933 38 -77 03 61% 1932/33 32 21 12 19% 
3. Predominantly urban counties 
%NSDAP CDEBTS %CATH USIZE Expl. %CHANGE CDEBTS %CATH %USIZE Expl. 
1928 27 10 01 8% 
1930 30 -27 -02 18% 1928/30 22 -38 -03 21% 
1932J 38 -51 -04 45% 1930/32 30 -56 -04 44% 
1932N 30 -51 -04 39% 1932/32 -41 22 -00 24% 
1933 37 -39 -03 32% 1932/33 16 39 05 16% 
Same operationalization of debt variables as in GRAPHS 1 and 2. 
DEBTS = agrarian debts + non-agrarian debts; 
ADEBTS = agrarian debts; 
CDEBTS = non-agrarian debts; 
URBAN = percent population in towns over 5000 inhabitants; 
USIZE = percent population in agglomerations over 20000 inhabitants; 
FSIZE = farm size (in hectare); 
EXPL = explained variance (percent). 
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TABLE 4: ADDING PERCENT SELF-EMPLOYED TO THE REGRES-
SION MODELS OF TABLE 3 
(standardized regression coefficients * 100) 
1. All counties 
Same operationalization of debt variables as in GRAPHS 1 and 2. 
DEBTS = agrarian debts + non-agrarian debts; 
ADEBTS = agrarian debts; 
CDEBTS = non-agrarian debts; 
URBAN • percent population in towns over 5000 inhabitants; 
USIZE = percent population in agglomerations over 20000 inhabitants 
FSIZE • farmsize (in h e c t a r e ) ; 
INDEP = percentage of self-employed and helping family members; 
EXPL = explained variance (percent). 
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GRAPH 1A: A TREE COMPARISON OF THE CORRELATION BET-
WEEN DEBTS AND THE NSDAP VOTE 1928-1933 
(PEARSON'S R * 100) 
Variable definitions/cutting points: 
Rural branch = agrarian debts; urban branch = non-agrarian debts. 
"Agrarian debts": number of indebted farms per eligible voter * 100; 
"Non-agrarian debts": number of indebted business firms per eligible voter * 
100. 
"Rural": less than 56 percent/"Urban": more than 56 percent living in towns with 
5000 inhabitants and more; "Catholic": more than 50 percent/"Protestant": less 
than 50 percent of county population are Catholic; "Farm size small": average 
farm size below/"Farm size large": average farm size above the national mean; 
"City size small": less than 50 percent/"City size large": more than 50 percent 
living in towns with 20 000 inhabitants and more. 
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GRAPH IB: A TREE COMPARISON OF THE RELATIONSHIP BET-
WEEN DEBTS AND THE 1928-1933 NSDAP VOTE IN DIFFERING 
SOCIAL CONTEXTS 
(cell entries: percent of eligible voters). 
Same variable definitions as in GRAPH 1A. 
A = debts above national average; B = debts below national average. 
Reading example: In November, 1932 the NSDAP was elected by 50 percent of the 
eligible voters in predominantly protestant, rural counties with an above 
average size of farms and an above average frequency of indebted farms; in rural 
protestant counties with an above average farm size where farms debts were below 
the national average the Nazis were elected by only 40 percent of the eligible 
voters etc. 
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GRAPH 2: A TREE COMPARISON OF THE RELATIONSHIP BET-
WEEN DEBTS AND THE PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF THE 
1928-1933 NSDAP VOTE IN DIFFERING SOCIAL CONTEXTS 
(county data; cell entries: percentage points t2 — 
Same variable definitions as in GRAPH 1A. 
A = debts above national average; B = debts below national average. 
Reading example: Between the elections of September, 1930 and July, 1932 
in the predominantly rural and protestant counties with an above average 
indebtedness the NSDAP increase amounted to 24 percentage points while 
in the same type of counties with a below average indebtedness the 
NSDAP increase was »only« 20 percent. 
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GRAPH 3: A LATENT VARIABLES PATH ANALYSIS (LVPLS) OF THE 
IMPACT OF DEBTS ON THE NSDAP VOTE 1928 - 1933 
(standardized path coefficients * 100) 
Manifest variables written in majuscular, latent variables in small letters. 
Definition of latent variables; first figure = factor weights (equivalent to 
partial regression coefficients); second figure = factor loadings (correla-
tion of each manifest variable with latent variable). 
- Rural vs. Urban: population (-21/-64), density (-30/-73), square miles 
(38/53), ^agrarian population (50/90). 
- Dependent vs. independent: %selfemployed (-19/-74), Whelping family 
members (-24/-88), %civi\ servants (25/83), %white collar (29/94), %blue 
collar (-9/-23), ^domestic servants (23/78). 
- Wealth: per capita income 1928 (48/97), per voter income (55/97). 
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